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Abstract
Both neuroethics and biopolitics are the 
newest discoveries of social sciences. 
They provide many problems and issu-
es concerning the human nature, criti-
cal for the current political thought. The 
mutual relation between them forces us 
also to focus on the solutions in legal 
system through the crucial meaning of 
the notion of responsibility – the critical 
issue of neuroethics. The main objecti-
ve of this article, therefore, is to: 1) to 
characterize neuroethics and its main 
approaches; 2) to introduce the current 
consensus reached in the debate on the 
freedom of will; 3) to outline the possible 
biopolitical consequences within the fra-
mes of the described paradigm.
For many years, a human being remains 
an unsolved mystery to many branches 
of science, within past few decades joined 
by biopolitics, searching for the new con-
ceptions of the political rules and prin-
ciples, while being focused on a matter 
as delicate as human life. Furthermore, 
the most objective measure of its assess-
ments, to be able to provide reasonable 
and commonly acceptable solutions. The 
contemporary science seems to answer 
this problem in the form of cognitive 
-
fty years both of them tried to discover 
the essence of humanity by conducting 
research on its base element, the human 
brain. According to an American philoso-
pher, Sam Harris, the result may trigger 
one caused by Darwinian theory of evo-
lution. It would source from the debates 
on the consciousness and the freedom of 
will, recently often associated with the 
concepts such as morality and responsi-
bility. The focal point of the information 
presented above is neuroethics as the 
creation of practical philosophy and neu-
rophilosophy, being also the newest and 
the most technical branch of bioethics. 
The aim of the article is, therefore, to pre-
sent the social implications, both positi-
ve and negative, as the result of the latest 
research on the human brain, submitted 
to the neuroethical thought, with the ac-
ceptance of the assumption that there is 
no such thing as the freedom of will. The 
adoption of the paradigm regarding the 
lack of the freedom of the will has a spe-
cial meaning. During the past three de-
cades, while cognitive science was signi-
the presented paradigm began to have 
an actual importance in the philosophy 
of politics and law, the evidence of which 
can be found, for example, in the book 
of an American philosopher, Ronald 
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Dworkin, who asked the following qu-
estions: “Under what circumstances is 
someone free to act as he wishes? Is his 
freedom compromised only when he is 
subject to some external constraint-on-
ly when he is tied up or locked up, for 
example? Or when he is mentally ill? Or 
when he cannot govern himself or control 
his appetites as he would wish? Or when 
he does not behave as right reason and 
true morality require? Or is his freedom 
illusory whenever his choices and beha-
vior are inevitable, given prior events or 
forces beyond his control? Is he free, that 
is, only if and when his own will acts as 
the uncaused cause of his behavior?” 
(Dworkin 2011, p. 211). The main ob-
jective of this article, therefore, narrows 
down to the execution of the following ta-
sks: 1) to characterize neuroethics and 
its main approaches; 2) to introduce the 
current consensus reached in the debate 
on the freedom of will; 3) to outline the 
possible biopolitical consequences within 
the frames of the described paradigm.
Reductionist and Holistic Paradigms 
in Neuroethics
Before proceeding to discuss neuroethics 
each reader should be aware of the the-
oretical pitfalls waiting for him at this 
-
porary debates on neuroethics, behavior 
and the human brain, there is an incre-
asingly observed return to some theses 
of behaviorism1, usually resulting from 
the misunderstanding of the opposition 
between reductionist and holistic appro-
1  Despite many similarities between the basic theses of 
the former studies attitudes, the latter tries to explain the 
reasons and mechanisms of human acts. One of the branches 
of neuroscience, social neuroscience, is the closest discipline to 
behaviorism (Cacioppo, Bernston 2005). p. 221
aches to the neurobiological research. 
In the dispute, a clear standpoint was 
taken by an American physicist, Fritjof 
Capra, who wrote: “The ideas set forth by 
of the twentieth century helped to give 
birth to a new way of thinking – “systems 
thinking” –  in terms of connectedness, 
relationships, context. According to the 
systems view, the essential properties 
of an organism, or living system, are 
properties of the whole, which none of 
the parts have. They arise from the in-
teractions and relationships among the 
parts. These properties are destroyed 
when the system is dissected, either phy-
sically or theoretically, into isolated ele-
ments. Although we can discern indivi-
dual parts in any system, these parts are 
not isolated, and the nature of the whole 
is always different from the mere sum of 
its parts.” (Capra 1996, p. 29). In other 
words, Capra made an intended referen-
ce to the Cartesian paradigm, which gave 
birth to the biomedical model presenting 
the human body as a machine and its ill-
nesses as a malfunctions. In this theory, 
any disruption in functioning of an organ 
is perceived as a damage to the whole 
body. The holistic approach proposed by 
Capra is therefore applicable to the hu-
man brain considered as a living system 
in the body, and seems to be the way of 
eradicating the returning symptoms of 
behaviorism from neurobiological rese-
arch. For example, the issue of emotions 
cannot be understood by considering it 
only in the context of the functioning of 
the limbic system or its chosen structu-
res. In this article, therefore, I argue that 
-
in perceived as hermetic systems, sho-
uld not play a key role in explaining the 
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human behavior. Instead, the emphasis 
should be placed on the mutual relation 
between two living systems: the human 
body and the human brain. Moreover, 
the problem of the freedom of will and 
neuroethics will be presented in the gi-
ven context.
Two Dimensions of Neuroethics
The spectacular progress in neuroscien-
it the understanding of many brain pro-
cesses. Such a sensitive matter, howe-
ver, aroused inevitable concerns around 
the obtained discoveries expressed by a 
Polish physicist and journalist, Tomasz 
Rożek, in one of his comments on the 
modern science: “Even if we cannot read 
someone’s exact thoughts, but only if 
the person likes or not what he or she 
hears or sees, I feel disturbed anyway.” 
(Rożek 2011, p. 304). Opinions simi-
lar to Rożek’s became the reason to the 
rise of the new branch of bioethics. The 
article with a very narrow meaning. The 
term referred to the ethical issues of neu-
rology as a profession, and especially to 
p. 697-713). A wider use of the concept 
was provided by an American publi-
Foundation, who in 2002, during the 
conference “Visions for A New Field of 
part of bioethics, which takes to conside-
ration good and bad consequences of me-
dical practices and biological research. It 
targets the brain, our consciousness and 
understanding of ourselves” and “the 
examination of what is right and wrong, 
good and bad about the treatment of, 
perfection of, or unwelcome invasion of 
and worrisome manipulation of the hu-
the conference, an English philosopher, 
Adina Roskies, published her article 
“Neuroethics for the New Millenium”, in 
which she proposed a division in neuro-
ethics based on two categories: ethics in 
neuroscience and neuroscience in ethics 
(Roskies 2002, p. 21-23), both beco-
ming popular paradigms. The former is 
Cranford and covers the most popular 
areas of neuroscience, namely diagnostic 
neuroimaging, predictive neuroimaging, 
neurostimulation, psychosurgery and 
cognitive enhancement. Although each 
of the branches holds promise for im-
proving the quality of modern diagnosis 
and medical treatment, mentioned tech-
niques, including e.g. Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET), functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and 
Electroencephalography (EEG), focus on 
the human brain and can reveal detailed 
information about the scanned person, 
which may further affect personal iden-
tity, decision-making process, social in-
teractions and many other aspects of our 
humanity and social existence, in both 
positive and negative ways. The newest 
example of the possibilities of scanning 
methods, precisely fMRI, is the rese-
arch conducted by Japanese scientists 
from National Institute of Information 
and Communications Technology in 
Kyoto. The team under the leadership of 
Yukiyasu Kamitani, created a computer 
algorithm matching patterns of brain ac-
tivity with object categories, previously 
made during fMRI scans. The script was 
then able to “read” the human dreams 
with more than 70 percent success rate 
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(Horikawa, Kamitani 2013, p. 639-642). 
The amazing discovery, however, raises 
many ethical questions and anxieties 
about the safety of our autonomy and 
privacy. The second of Roskies’ para-
digms, neuroscience in ethics, covers 
the issues especially interesting for neu-
rophilosophers and the philosophers of 
law: neuronal basis of moral behavior, 
responsibility, a personality, decision
-making process and the problem of free 
will. It emerged in 1848, by the well-k-
nown case of Phineas Gage, 25 years old 
craftsman, who’s head was pierced by a 
metal rod through the skull, the left jaw, 
the eye socket, the temporal lobe and the 
vault. Although he survived the accident, 
there were many observable changes in 
his behavior and personality (Harlow 
1848, p. 389-393). The similar events 
have inspired an American psycholo-
gist, Michael Gazzaniga, to conduct in 
1960’s experiments on the commissure 
intersection effect on the functions of the 
brain. Around his research arose many 
mentioned paradigm. Twenty years later, 
an American neuroscientist, Benjamin 
Libet, has empirically proven that the 
freedom of will does not exist (Libet 2002, 
p. 551-564), so the question “if we are 
actually dependent from the biology of 
body” has changed it form to ask about 
the degree of the dependence. Therefore, 
by using those and similar theories, neu-
roethics tries to establish how far re-
aches our responsibility for what we do 
in given circumstances.
Meaning of the Question About the 
Freedom of Will
The discussion on the freedom of will 
has been the domain of philosophy sin-
ce it was started by St. Augustine. For 
minds have been trying to determine a 
-
nable theory to reach it, was well-argu-
ed and internally consistent philosophy 
of Arthur Schopenhauer. To put it in a 
nutshell, Schopenhauer perceived the 
free will as an ability to freely want what 
we want. He also argued that using it is 
impossible, because of incentives and hi-
gher motives constantly affecting our de-
cisions. Schopenhauer’s idea of the inner 
world2 being the will itself became scien-
Benjamin Libet. In his most famous ar-
ticle the American psychologist wrote: 
“The role of conscious free will would 
be, then, not to initiate a voluntary act, 
but rather to control occurrences of the 
act. We may view the unconscious initia-
tives for voluntary actions as “bubbling 
up” in the brain. The conscious-will then 
selects which of these initiatives may go 
forward to an action or which ones to veto 
and abort, with no act appearing.” (Libet 
2002, p. 560). The convergence between 
Schopenhauer’s and Libet’s theories is 
undeniable3. Moreover, Libet’s theory 
-
sophical circles, but also the rise of the 
2  The term “the inner world” means mental representations 
of the world.
3 
theses. The philosophical point of view of both scientists, 
however, was different. While the former was a determinist, 
arguing that people are responsible for what they do through 
their ability to hold unconscious initiatives, the former was a 
pessimistic incompatibilitist who believed that every behavior is 
determined by past or present events and motives.
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long-sought consensus. It was not fully 
accepted, however, because of the deep 
belief of many philosophers, and people 
as well, that the free will exists. The co-
nviction results from the human ability 
to make free choices. So-called physi-
cal freedom4, denied by Schopenhauer, 
proved to be at least partially right, be-
cause of the reference to the notions of 
intention and consciousness’ aspect of 
our acts outlined by Libet. The belief has 
found a resonance, for instance, in the 
philosophy of the American law5.
 Contemporary debates on the fre-
edom of will gave rise to new considera-
tions on the concepts of responsibility, 
morality and criminal law. One of these 
theories is, created by Sam Harris, the 
concept of moral responsibility to so-
ciety. The philosopher argued that the 
assessment of liability must depend on 
the general state of mind rather than the 
metaphysics of mental causation. So he 
was ready to abandon the problem of free 
will in favor of the properties of mind and 
facts relevant to the case, for example, 
beliefs, desires, education and personali-
ty of the accused, the presence of drugs, 
etc. (Harris 2010, p. 73-74). The other 
and more complex theory is the one cre-
ated by Ronald Dworkin, who proposed 
an ethical, instead of a moral, approach 
to the concept of responsibility. First of 
all, however, Dworkin began creating his 
4  Schopenhauer argued that there are three dimensions of 
freedom: physical, intellectual and moral. In his division, both 
the physical and moral freedom were illusionary feelings. Only 
a man able to negate the highest incentive, the will to live, can 
achieve the moral freedom.
5  “The Supreme Court even has called free will a “’universal 
and persistent’ foundation stone in our system of law”, as 
compared with “a deterministic view of human conduct that is 
inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice 
system.” (Bechara, Burns 2007).
theory by underlining the logical gap be-
-
answered only through empirical inve-
stigation or philosophical speculation 
– and the last set, about responsibility, 
which are independent ethical and mo-
ral issues.” (Dworkin 2011, p. 221-222). 
negating the pessimistic incompatibi-
lism. In other words, Dworkin recognized 
it as false, which was caused by his tho-
ughts on the decision-making process. 
The philosopher emphasized that a hu-
we consider before and after performing. 
Using this assumption, Dworkin created 
the concept of judgmental responsibili-
-
cisions, subjected to the standard act of 
assessment – in the context of praise or 
reprimand (Dworkin 2011, p. 220-223). 
Another very important observation in 
responsibility has been made by Michael 
the brain correlate of responsibility, be-
cause that is something we ascribe to 
humans – to people – not to brains. It is 
a moral value we demand of our fellow, 
rule-following human beings. (…) The 
issue of responsibility (…) is a social cho-
more or less responsible than any other 
for actions. We are all part of a determi-
nistic system that someday, in theory, 
we will completely understand. Yet the 
idea of responsibility, a social construct 
that exists in the rules of a society, does 
not exist in the neuronal structures of 
the brain.” (Gazzaniga 2005, p. 101-102) 
Both Harris and Dworkin, and also many 
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other philosophers, followed Gazzaniga’s 
thought.
 The thing that should attract our 
attention is the common and intelligibile6 
intuition, that the pessimistic incompa-
tibilism is false. Harris also, but unkno-
wingly, underwent it, although theses he 
has formulated in his book on the free will 
are almost identical to Schopenhauer’s, 
which almost completely made him a non-
compatibilitist (Harris 2012). The given 
example shows how hard is to accept the 
fact that the free will is an illusion, even 
-
re that decision-making process is gre-
do not necessarily reach consciousness 
(Bechara, Burns 2007, p. 263-264) and 
that brain damage or drug usage can 
disturb the normal operation of some of 
these implicit processes (Bechara, Burns 
2007, p. 264), we should consider the 
question about philosophical and then 
political consequences of the acceptance 
by the common intuition mentioned at 
the beginning of the paragraph.
Relations Between Neuroethics and 
Biopolitics
There are two categories of the possible 
consequences of the assumptions resul-
ting from the outlined division of neuro-
ethics. First of them refers to the neuro-
science in ethics paradigm and concerns 
the concepts of morality, responsibility, 
free will, criminal law, etc. In the previo-
us section of this article are described 
the examples of theoretical considera-
tions on them. In this part, I will focus on 
the political dimension of the presented 
issues. The second paradigm of neuro-
6  According to Dworkin (Dworkin 2011).
ethics, ethics in neuroscience, relates to 
the ethical aspects of the use of the latest 
neurotechnology. It turns out that the-
se discoveries carry with them as well an 
opportunity to improve the medical dia-
gnosis and treatment, as threats to the 
social existence of a person.
 One of the most important trans-
lation of the problem of free will on the 
language of policy took place at the turn 
of 18th and 19th century. Its description 
can be found in the book of an Italian 
philosopher of politics, Roberto Esposito: 
“The theory of a double biological layer 
within every living being – one vegetative 
and unconscious, and the other cerebral 
Bichat in the form of medical knowled-
ge, then ‘translated’ by Schopenhauer 
into philosophical knowledge and by 
Comte into sociological knowledge. This 
theorization initiated a process of de-
subjectivization, which was destined to 
drastically change the framework of the 
modern concept of the political. Once 
human beings were thought to be inter-
nally traversed by the tension between 
two heterogeneous forces and actually 
determined, in our passions, and even 
in our will, by a force more in keeping 
with simple reproductive life, the very 
premise on which the modern political 
paradigm was founded could no longer 
be sustained. If individuals were immer-
sed in the blind corporeality of their ve-
getative life, incapable even of governing 
themselves, how could they intentionally 
create a political order such as to be able 
to derive their subjective rights from it?” 
(Esposito 2012, p. 6). The cited scheme 
many of contemporary political systems. 
For instance, deconstruction and desub-
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jectivization of a person supported to-
talitarianism and authoritarianism; the 
inability to self-reliance supported the 
establishments of communitarianism, 
and so on. A special case for which we 
should pay attention, is the thought of 
Thomas Hobbes, in which he used a de-
terminism7 as a premise for the creation 
of basis of the later liberal thought (Van 
den Enden 1979, p. 187). This shows up 
how different from each other may be re-
ached biopolitical concepts, depending 
upon the original understanding of the 
issue of free will. I intentionally used the 
word “biopolitical”, because the delibera-
tions on determinism and its acceptance 
or rejection, lead to a dual understanding 
-
mative8. The former assumes that people 
are not competent to decide their own 
destiny, thus they require a total power 
over them. The latter perceives a man as 
free, conscious, aware and, what is the 
-
al. Of course, the negative interpretation 
of biopolitics, but leading to the concept 
of social contract, as did Hobbes, is also 
possible. Although almost all modern le-
gal and political systems sources from 
7  “The position of Hobbes in the controversy is that which 
defends actional liberty, combined with volitional determinism. 
With actional liberty is meant here that some actions can be 
legitimately called voluntary actions. Those are actions which 
proceed from the will of the actor, which means that they would 
not occur if there were no will that determined them. For those 
that he is capable of this sort of actions, man can be said to be 
free. He is free as far as he is a subject of such voluntary actions. 
(…) On the other hand, by volitional determinism is meant the 
conviction that the will itself cannot legitimately be called free 
in the sense of being indetermined and capable of autonomous 
selfdetermination. The so-called “will” can only be understood 
and explained if it is apprehended as a volitional process which 
is determined by its antecedent causes.” (Van den Enden 1979).
8  Both terms are derived from the philosophy of Roberto 
Esposito (Esposito 2008, 2012, Vatter 2013).
determinism, they still weapon the co-
nviction of an intuitive perception of the 
will of as a free. Hence the consequence 
of the complete acceptance of determi-
nism may become the total collapse of 
the system and the need to create a new 
one, or at least the need to reform the 
existing, and assuming the reprioritiza-
tion of its values (Bechara, Burns 2007, 
p. 274).
 -
tegories of neuroscience covered by the 
ethics in neuroscience paradigm: dia-
gnostic neuroimaging, predictive neu-
roimaging, neurostimulation, psycho-
surgery and cognitive enhancement. 
Consequences of their application was 
described by Francis Fukuyama, who 
wrote: “Biotechnology falls somewhere 
between extremes. Transgenic crops and 
human genetic engineering make people 
uneasy. But biotechnology also promi-
-
alth and well-being. (…) The real threat 
of biotechnology is far more subtle, and 
therefore harder to weigh in any utilita-
rian calculus.” (Fukuyama 2002, p. 182). 
Although the philosopher mainly focu-
sed on the genetic engineering, similar 
words can be said about neuroscience. 
According to the notice of Fukuyama, I 
will disregard the utilitarian approach, in 
place of an appealing to the classic de-
-
science in the context of consequentia-
as the impact of applying a neuroscience 
technique to the personality, decisions 
and behavior of the individual – and pu-
blic – in other words, social, including 
changes of perception of the individual by 
the society, in the face of new knowledge 
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or context, re-
sulting from the application of one of the 
techniques.
 
categories mentioned at the beginning of 
the previous paragraph, based on the gi-
-
stic neuroimaging, which potential the-
rapeutic value is far more than obvious, 
however, is also ethically controversial. 
Suppose that someone does a reprehen-
sible and blameworthy act and then un-
dergoes fMRI scan, which shows struc-
tural damage or abnormal activity of this 
person’s brain region, responsible, e.g., 
for decision-making process and con-
trol of impulsive behavior9. On the one 
hand, this information is very heavy to 
accept by the accused person, but on 
the other, it is also very useful for the 
society, which from now on may take me-
dical care of that person or put him or 
her into jail. Moreover, diagnostic neuro-
imaging involves another very important 
issue, which I have outlined as a return 
of behaviorism. In other words, focusing 
-
ining the link between functioning of the 
brain and reprehensible behavior10.
 The second category is psycho-
surgery. This kind of treatment is the 
method of last resort for obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD). Nowadays, 
its use is much more accurate than 20 
years ago, but still associated with the 
considerable risk of damage to adjacent 
9  Prefrontal cortex (PFC) is the one responsible.
10  For instance, in the given example of disorder of decision-
making process and control of impulsive behavior, PFC is not 
the only one brain region having importance. Particular regions 
of parietal and temporal lobes are also involved.
parts of the brain. Despite of this, the 
person subjected to psychosurgery, tho-
ugh cured of the OCD, usually acquires 
and suffers from other disorders caused 
by the physical intervention in the bra-
in, loses the ability to freely operating in 
-
den for the latter. The given example 
clearly shows the contrast between per-
The very similar anxiety applies to the 
third category, neurostimulation, which 
is, however, less invasive and reversible 
method. It is also more often preferred 
solution since the invention of stereotac-
tic procedures (Lasak, Gorecki 2009, p. 
593-599), although its long-term effects 
remain unknown.
 The fourth category is cogniti-
ve enhancement. Using drugs such as 
-
able improve our cognitive capacities, for 
example, concentration, memory, lear-
ning skills, perceptivity, mood, the time 
of wakefulness, and so on. This issue is 
part of the broad debate on human en-
hancement, in which the main objec-
tions against the use of listed and simi-
lar drugs are raised by bioconservatists. 
One of them, Michael Sandel, argues, 
that the acceptance of human enhancing 
methods leads to the elimination of valu-
es such as dignity, virtue, and equality 
(Dominiak, Perlikowski, Płotka 2013, p. 
182). In other words, he considered per-
The issue of the improvement of cogniti-
ve abilities is also associated with the 
intriguing thought experiment proposed 
by Harris. “Consider what would happen 
if we discovered a cure for human evil. 
(…) The cure for psychopathy can be put 
directly into the food supply like vita-
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min D. Evil is now nothing more than a 
instance, the prospect of withholding the 
cure for evil from a murderer as part of 
his punishment. Would this make any 
moral sense at all? What could it possi-
bly mean to say that a person deserves 
to have this treatment withheld? What if 
the treatment had been available prior 
to the person’s crime? Would he still 
be responsible for his actions? It seems 
far more likely that those who had been 
aware of his case would be indicted for 
negligence.” (Harris 2010, p. 75). The ci-
ted fragment shows not only the depen-
dence of our moral intuitions from the 
development of cognitive enhancement, 
but also the shift in the assessment of 
factors responsible for the human beha-
vior.
 The last category is predictive 
neuroimaging. Although the latest di-
scoveries in this discipline may provide 
many precious data about the human 
behavior, they are perceived as a threat 
to the autonomy of person11. Notable is 
the fact, that predictive imaging is the 
only one from listed categories, which 
cases are almost always placed at the 
central point of the Figure 1. For instan-
ce, when a patient receives bad results 
of the scan, he “suffers” as well as his 
social existence, and vice versa, when he 
receives good results of the scan, it po-
society. Of course, a necessary condition 
for the occurrence of both situations is 
the disclosure of patient’s medical re-
cord, which is the next controversy aro-
und predictive neuroimaging. If the data 
11  I mean especially such methods as the dream reading or 
using fMRI scans, or any other neuroimaging technique, as the 
evidence in the court.
achieved during the scan can negatively 
affect a personality or social existence of 
the patient, is the researcher obligated to 
disclose this information? The other and 
highly intriguing question was aroused 
by the situation, in which a researcher 
discovers that the patient’s brain indica-
tes a predisposition to psychopathology. 
What should be done with such a per-
son? A promising answer was given by an 
American endocrinologist, Robert Blank: 
“In the near future, this debate is likely 
to shift to the use of preemptive man-
dated interventions to modify the brain 
chemistry of those persons diagnosed 
through brain imaging tests as being at 
risk for violent behavior. Paradoxically, 
new knowledge about the interaction of 
the brain and the childhood environment 
-
ventive policies in response to early mala-
doptive behaviors of males in particular.” 
(Blank 2011, p. 219). There is a rema-
ining question, however, about the natu-
re of these preventive actions – whether 
they will actually rely on the medical tre-
atment or, as in Giorgio Agamben’s the-
ory, on the limiting freedom of potential-
ly dangerous persons? Regardless of the 
answer to this question, one thing is cer-
tain – as writes Fukuyama: “In the face 
of the challenge from a technology like 
this, where good and bad are intimately 
connected, it seems to me that there can 
be only one possible response: countries 
must regulate the development and use 
of technology politically, setting up in-
stitutions that will discriminate between 
those technological advances that pro-
pose a threat to human dignity and well
-being.” (Fukuyama 2002, p. 182). The 
task outlined by Fukuyama will require 
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the elaborating of coherent and reasona-
ble theses, which can be delivered by the 
new discipline of politics – biopolitics.
Conclusions
The article covered one of the most intri-
guing from the contemporary theoretical 
neuroethical research on political theses. 
Key concepts were explained in this area, 
providing the necessary knowledge to na-
vigate in this subject. Therefore, the main 
objective of the article has been achie-
ved, giving the wider perspective on the 
pragmatic meaning of the assumption of 
the non-existence of free will. The article 
can be also used as a starting point for 
further analysis of the outlined topics.
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